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Intermodal rail freight service, in the form of semi-trailers and containers carried by rail in 
coordination with connecting road and water transport operators, emerged in North America on 
a few railways during the 1920s and 1930s.  Experience gained from these early ventures inspired 
widespread introduction of intermodal service offerings after 1950. Between 1990 and 2005, rail 
intermodal traffic grew 87.7 percent, from 6.2 million to 11.7 containers and trailers, and now 
holds a significant position in the aggregate traffic base of the major North American rail freight 
carriers. Previous research and other sources of data and information are drawn upon to identify 
key drivers of this growth within the context of a conceptual model. The driving forces include 
changes in transport providers’ business policies and practices, government deregulation of 
pricing and other commercial actions by firms in rail and competing modes of transport, 
advancements in rail intermodal technology, and changes in supply chain management processes 
by shippers and consignees that have intensified demand for freight service of higher quality and 
lower cost. Comments on transferability to Europe of lessons learned from intermodal business 
experience in North America are provided in the concluding section. 
 
Keywords: intermodal rail freight development; freight transport management; government 
transport policy; North America 
 
1. Introduction 
Rail intermodal traffic in North America grew 88.7 percent, from 6.2 million containers and 
trailers in 1990 to 11.7 million in 2005 (AAR, 2006), and has become an important sector within 
the aggregate rail freight traffic base.   This paper identifies and explains key drivers of the origin 
and rise of intermodal service within the continent. To do so, the paper first presents a conceptual 
framework set forth in section 2 below, and then discusses prime aspects of the components 
within the framework, utilizing information and data drawn from previous research and other 
sources. That discussion is followed by an exposition of the evolution of intermodal rail freight 
service from its pioneer era in the 1920s to the present day.  
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Both the conceptual framework and its explanatory findings resulted from research performed as 
part of a European Commission (EC)-sponsored project named REORIENT.3  The EC-sponsored 
project focused on identification of conditions related to establishment of integrated, seamless 
cross-border intermodal railway freight service within a north-south corridor in eleven Central 
and Eastern European countries. The results reported in this paper were obtained for the purpose 
of identifying factors critical to the success of intermodal rail freight service that could, either fully 
or in part, be applicable within Europe and, in particular, the REORIENT corridor. Hence, the 
paper concludes with commentary on such applicability.    
2. Conceptual framework – rail intermodal business drivers 
Figure 1 portrays the framework of actors and events that this research identified as the basic 
interrelated drivers of growth in intermodal railway business volume in North America. The 
components are bracketed at top and bottom by two overarching influences on intermodal 
freight flows, i.e., globalization and changes in international trade flows, and developments in 
computer and communications technology. Before proceeding further, it must be acknowledged 
that the sequences and directions of interrelationships between each component of the 
framework are complex, and that the relative importance of each component and the linkages of 
causality between each (i.e., degree of impact on intermodal rail freight performance) cannot be 
quantified with precision.  
Several studies on intermodal freight transport were basic to development of the conceptual 
framework. Taylor and Jackson (2000) discuss evolution of the U.S. intermodal rail freight 
industry from the perspective of marketing channel theory and provide a competitive framework 
of the rail intermodal industry based on Porter’s five forces analysis. Shashikumar and Schatz 
(2000) identify the role of ocean carriers’ actions after occurrence of U.S. transportation economic 
deregulation as being critical in developing international intermodal rail freight transport. They 
emphasize the importance of ocean shipping economic deregulation in the U.S. in providing 
ocean carriers with the bargaining power to negotiate with U.S. railroads to provide intermodal 
freight service. Evers and Johnson (2000) analyzed shippers’ perceptions of rail intermodal 
service. Their conclusions were that the overall performance perceptions were driven by “shipper 
perceptions of communications, quality of customer service, consistent delivery, transit times, 
and competitive rates.” In their essay on intermodal freight transportation, DeWitt and Clinger 
(2000) suggest that intermodal rail freight growth in the 2000s will be influenced by the increase 
in effective supply chain management practices on the part of freight shippers. 
To obtain first-hand information about the importance of the factors that led to the growth of the 
U.S. intermodal industry, structured interviews and informal discussions were conducted with 
industry executives who had both longevity and breadth of experience in the U.S. intermodal rail 
freight industry from a career perspective. The conceptual framework was developed from a 
synthesis of these discussions as well as extensive review of pertinent literature ranging from 
research-based articles and reports to trade press articles. The industry personnel all had 
intermodal rail freight experience obtained from work in the intermodal business units of railway 
companies and in third-party intermodal firms, and as intermodal customers.     
While it is difficult to quantitatively or empirically test the conceptual framework, the authors of 
this article evaluated it using additional qualitative research methodology.  The conceptual 
framework was developed by means of a narrative examination of intermodal rail freight, which 
is presented below in Section 3.  Narrative methods have been found useful for analyzing cross-
                                                        
3 The authors’ portion of the REORIENT project was administered by the Larson Pennsylvania Transportation 
Institute, College of Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA. 
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cultural organization research (Soin and Scheytt, 2006). Spicer (2008) discusses the history of 
ideas as a valid methodological approach in public administration research.  Both methods are 
used in this analysis to help confirm the drivers and identify the changing business models of the 

























Globalisation and Changes in Trade Flows
Developments in Computer and Communications Technology
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of Rail Intermodal Business Drivers.4 
2.1 Government Policy Makers 
Policy choices by government officials that impact most directly and significantly on the viability 
of intermodal rail freight traffic (and of all other types of rail service) include (1) funding of 
capital investment, maintenance and repair, and traffic control expenditures for urban and 
intercity roads and ocean ports; (2) specification of motor truck size and weight limits; (3) 
charging/taxation for road and port usage; (4) transport safety and national security regulation; 
and (5) economic regulation of rail and other modes of transport competitive with, and 
complementary to, rail. A comprehensive review of subject matter relating to each of these policy 
categories exceeds the ambit of this paper. However, actions and conditions with impact of most 
immediate relevance to the evolution and current state of intermodal rail freight business are 
exposited in the following paragraphs. 
2.2 Road Infrastructure, Trucking, and Cross-Border Freight Flow Controls 
During the second half of the 20th Century, U.S. federal government leadership of the financing, 
construction, and placement into service of the 46,508-mile National System of Interstate and 
Defense Highways, together with other major road improvement and expansion projects 
undertaken by state and local governments, enabled motor freight carriers to reduce their unit 
costs of operation and significantly improve their service quality (particularly, transit-time and 
service reliability). Truckers in Canada also benefited greatly from major road-building and 
                                                        
4 The conceptual framework presented here has been revised from the framework utilized in the REORIENT 
project.  Alterations were made to increase clarity and focus.  Readers interested in the original version can obtain 
it by contacting the authors or accessing the REORIENT Final Report at www.reorient.no, D6.2, Implications of 
New Management and Business Models for Rail Operators and IM Companies. 
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upgrading projects undertaken by national and provincial governments. In addition to increasing 
road capacity in terms of total mileage, these expansion and improvement initiatives provided 
advances in road and bridge load-bearing capacity, lane width, and other elements of road 
structure design and construction which enabled increases in permissible gross weights, axle 
weights, length limits, and vehicle combinations (e.g., multiple-trailer operation) for road freight 
vehicles. 
The enhancement of competitive advantages made possible by such infrastructure advancements 
accelerated motor carriers’ penetration of freight transport markets and placed rail freight 
carriers, operating on their own privately-financed (and taxed) infrastructure, under increasing 
economic siege after the 1950s (Ainsworth, 1975; Spychalski, 1997b). Between 1960 and 1990, 
truck ton-miles in the United States went up 158 percent. Rail ton-miles also rose, but by a much 
more modest 85 percent. Measured in terms of value, trucking experienced even more dramatic 
growth within the same time frame. Expenditures for intercity road freight service jumped up by 
803 percent, while spending on rail freight service grew by 237 percent (UGPTI and ENO, 2007). 
The rises in truck traffic and payments for trucking service did not come solely from capture of 
rail business. Rather, much of it came from new freight movements generated by national 
economic growth. 
Most roads are shared-use facilities, accommodating significant volumes of traffic by different 
types of vehicles of widely varying sizes and weights. This situation poses the long-standing 
related issues of (1) assigning or allocating specific elements of road construction and 
maintenance costs to particular classes of vehicles, e.g., passenger automobiles, motor coaches, 
and light-, medium-, and heavy-weight trucks, and (2) whether operators of each class of vehicle 
are paying their ‘fair’ (or adequate) share of total road costs. It has long and often been contended 
that road user charges (primarily fuel taxes) paid by operators of heavy trucks do not fully cover 
the portion of road costs (excluding social costs) that they cause, as evidenced by data obtained 
from engineering-based studies. To the extent that it might exist, this ‘deficit’ will result in the 
underpricing of motor freight service vis-a-vis rail and hence, make possible diversion of freight 
shipments to truck that might otherwise move by rail. This implies that imposition of ‘full cost-
based’ user charges on operators of heavy trucks would shift at least some truck traffic to rail. 
However, the extent to which such a shift would actually occur will depend on (1) the cross price 
elasticity of demand between truck and rail and the degree of fit between rail carriers’ physical 
handling capabilities and service quality levels, and (2) shippers’ and consignees’ transport 
service quality requirements and physical access capabilities for sending and receiving shipments 
by rail vis-à-vis truck (Boyer, 1997; Wilson, 1980).  
Since the 1990s, inbound cargo movements from overseas origins and cross-border freight 
movements within North America have experienced continuing growth. However, they have 
been subjected to cost increases and declines in service quality stemming from more stringent 
government efforts to control illegal immigration and importation of illicit narcotics. These 
negative impacts have been compounded since the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in the 
United States by implementation of security measures intended to prevent or at least reduce the 
probability of acts of terror. Actions proposed and taken to prevent the use of international ocean 
containers as instruments for acts of terrorism thus have become of particular current importance 
for both users and providers of intermodal rail service (Sarathy, 2006; Taylor et al., 2004; A fence, 
2008). 
EJTIR 9(1), March 2009, pp 63-82 
Spychalski and Thomchick 




2.3 Economic Deregulation of Transport 
Economic regulation of transport, as administered historically in North America by quasi-
independent commissions5, can be defined in summary terms as government control of key elements 
of business behaviour by transport firms, on (1) matters internal to a particular transport firm; (2) 
relationships between transport firms and their customers; and (3) competitive and complementary 
relationships between transport firms. As is indicated by the box entitled “Transport Economic 
Deregulation” in Figure 1, economic regulation no longer applies to intermodal rail freight traffic. 
Impacts which such regulation imposed during the time at which it did apply will be noted in 
following sections of the paper. 
3. Evolution of intermodal rail freight – drivers of changing business 
models 
The evolution of intermodal rail freight service can be examined within the conceptual context of 
a business model, or of a series of business models of different types. The term business model is 
very much related to business strategy. In simple terms, it is the firm’s “way of doing business” 
(Voelpel et al., 2004). Another way of describing a business model is “the combination of ‘who’, 
‘what’, ‘when’, ‘why’, ‘where’, ‘how’, and ‘how much’ an organization employed to serve its 
customers, end users and other stakeholders (including but not limited to employees, partners, 
suppliers, distributors, lenders, shareholders and the communities affected by the organization’s 
activities)” (Mitchel and Coles, 2004).6 We now turn to an exposition of the ways in which the 
actors and events specified in Figure 1 have shaped the development, performance, and conduct 
(business models) of intermodal service through four distinct phases of its evolution.  
3.1 Pioneer Era – 1920s-1952 
Precursors of contemporary intermodal rail freight transport appeared in North America in the 
19th Century. However, none grew into widespread use (McKenzie et al., 1989).  
The dawn of substantive containerised intermodal service came in the early 1920s with its 
introduction on two different main line railroads. Both linked Chicago and St. Louis with the 
Atlantic Coast. They saw container operation as a tool for (1) reducing the terminal cross-dock 
handling costs, high loss and damage, and low rail equipment utilization that plagued their 
haulage of less-than-carload (LCL) shipments, and (2) meeting competition for such traffic from 
the inter-city trucking industry that had emerged after World War I and was expanding rapidly 
in consort with post-war government-funded construction of hard-surfaced inter-city roads. Both 
rail carriers ‘retailed’ the sale of containerized service to shippers, just as they did with 
conventional LCL and full carload service. The containers were small (e.g., 6 x 9 x 7.5 ft.) and had 
relatively high tare weight (e.g., 2,800 lbs.) to lading capacity (e.g., 6,000 lbs.) Nevertheless, the 
service grew rapidly for both railroads (Moulton, 1933).  
However, realisation of the economic benefit of these pioneering container service ventures was 
soon blunted by federal regulatory actions taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).7  
                                                        
5 Quasi-independent commissions empowered to regulate transport were established as agencies outside the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of state, provincial, and federal governments. It was the intent of the 
legislators who created such agencies to insulate them from undue short-term political pressures and to have 
them staffed with personnel possessing requisite specialised knowledge of regulatory methods and rail transport.   
6 Other research offers more formal definitions (e.g., Schmid, et al., 2001; Hamel, 2000; and Viscio and Paternack, 
1996).   
7 Quasi-independent federal regulatory agency (see endnote 1 above) charged with administering economic 
regulation of rail transport between 1887 and its replacement by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) on 1 
January 1996 (Spychalski, 1997a). 
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The two railroads had priced their container movements on the basis of weight and distance 
rather than the type and value of commodity or product carried. This deviation from the then-
traditional and universal practice of value-of-product-based differential pricing of railway freight 
service was largely disallowed by the ICC, in an attempt to protect rail competitors of the two 
innovating carriers from loss of traffic and revenue8 (White, 1984, p. 32).  
Despite this enterprise-dampening regulatory action, several other rail firms, less prominent in 
size than the two pioneering container operators, also instituted intermodal service between the 
mid-1920s and the late 1930s. Technologically, they utilized trailer-on-flat car (TOFC) rather than 
container-on-flat car (COFC) equipment. Most achieved commercial viability through the years 
following their introduction.  
Viewed collectively, these pioneering TOFC services embodied several critical success factors. 
First was development and application of operational and economically feasible techniques for 
loading and unloading trailers from rail flat cars, and for securing the trailers to flat cars during 
rail movement. Second was an available supply of flat cars capable of being equipped for haulage 
of trailers at modest cost. Third was supply of the service at quality levels (speed and reliability) 
competitive with over-the-highway trucking. This entailed operation of intermodal service on 
fixed passenger train-like schedules.   
Fourth was avoidance or minimisation of obstruction from economic regulation. In 1935, the U.S. 
Congress subjected interstate trucking to economic regulation by the ICC.  This enabled rail firms 
to file joint motor-rail carrier rate and service tariffs with the ICC. Revenues obtained from traffic 
moved under the rates published in the tariff were shared between the railway and the 
participating trucking firm. The rates themselves embodied type-of-product-based differential 
pricing. By the late 1930s, at least one railway was also carrying trailers for shippers’ ‘own 
account’ or private carriage trucking operations. 
A sixth critical success factor was the existence of freight market conditions that made TOFC 
service a viable alternative to over-the-road trucking on the short-to-medium-distance routes 
(e.g., 250-600 miles) on which most of the pioneering TOFC services were operated. These 
conditions included (1) economic regulation of the trucking industry, which restricted entry of 
additional motor carriers into markets served by truckers who used rail intermodal service, and 
permitted collective pricing among competing motor carriers, and (2) highway operating 
conditions in the form of truck size and weight limits, motor truck and trailer technology, and 
road geometry characteristics which gave line-haul movement of trailers by TOFC an economic 
advantage over all-highway movements (Grant, 1984; DeBoer, 1992). 
By the early 1950s, TOFC services of varying scope and scale were being operated on segments of 
a half-dozen main line railroads. Their apparent success drew increasing attention from other rail 
firms as a possible means for counteracting rising competition from trucking.  The stage thus was 
set for wider adoption of intermodal (Morgan, 1960a).   
3.2 Toward Industry-Wide Adoption – 1953-1963 
In 1953, the Southern Pacific (SP), a then-dominant railroad in the western states, began 
piggyback service with a distinctive business model, i.e.: 
• Operation of the service on an intrastate basis between San Francisco and Los Angeles, so 
that it would not be subject to ICC-administered economic regulation. 
                                                        
8 The ICC’s protectionist stance was dictated by the law that specified its powers and duties. In 1920, that law was 
amended to require that the ICC administer regulation in such a way as to enable preservation of rail service (a) 
on financially weak segments of the U.S. rail network and (b) for commodity movements unable to bear fully 
remunerative charges. This required, inter alia, maintenance of a structure of railway freight rates that would 
enable cross-subsidization between different segments of the network, and between different groups of freight 
shippers (Locklin, 1966). 
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• No cooperation with competitive truckers. The SP bought and furnished trailers to its 
customers and published commodity-based value of service rates for the service. 
• Pick-up and delivery of trailers from and to intermodal terminals by SP’s wholly-owned 
trucking subsidiary, the Pacific Motor Trucking Company (PMT). 
• Interstate service to Phoenix, Arizona, offered by means of PMT’s existing over-the-road 
trucking route between Los Angles and Phoenix.  
SP’s policy of acting as exclusive retail marketer and operator of the service caused truckers to 
request that the ICC prohibit it. However, intrastate operation of the rail portion of the service 
made the ICC powerless to act (Hofsommer, 1986; De Boer, 1992). 
The truckers’ futile protests of the SP’s TOFC service raised several questions concerning the 
regulatory status of interstate intermodal rail freight. Fearing that further pursuit of these 
questions by truckers could result in regulatory actions detrimental to its established (15 years) 
successful intermodal service, the New Haven Railroad asked the ICC for resolution of the 
questions. Space limits preclude full coverage of them here.9 Suffice it to say that the ICC 
answered all of the New Haven’s questions in ways supportive of continued development of rail 
intermodal service (I.C.C., 1954). The ICC’s action quickly led the railway industry to establish 
uniform rules or plans for intermodal traffic. Many of the characteristics of these plans or 
business models (Figure 2) have carried down to present day intermodal rail business.  
In 1954, aided by the ICC’s favorable action, the number of piggyback service providers doubled 
when thirteen main line railroads10 joined the pioneers. Most significant among them from a 
business model perspective, and thus deserving of attention in some detail here, were the 
Pennsylvania (PRR) and the New York Central (NYC).  
The PRR was then the largest railroad in North America by several measures, and exerted strong 
influence over rail industry business and technical policies. It began TOFC operation on a modest 
scale, utilizing flat cars with carrying capacity for a single truck trailer moved in conventional 
freight trains and marketed directly to shippers by its own sales personnel. 
 
                                                        
9 Among the most important, each answered in the affirmative, were whether a railway could (a) transport 
intermodal freight shipments without obtaining authority from the ICC to conduct interstate trucking operations; 
(b) transport trailers of private truckers; and (c) make joint rates with some motor common carriers and refuse to 
do so with others.   
10 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe; Baltimore & Ohio; Chicago & North Western; Delaware, Lackawanna & Western; 
Erie;  Great Northern; Kansas City Southern;  Lehigh Valley; Missouri-Kansas-Texas; New York Central; New 
York, Chicago & St. Louis (Nickel Plate Road); Pennsylvania; and Wabash.  
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• Shipper deals directly with motor freight carrier, using motor carrier-provided trailer 
or container. 
• Trailer or container carried by rail for line-haul movement between intermodal 
terminals.  
• Motor freight carrier provides pick-up and delivery (drayage) of trailer or container.  
Plan 2 
• Shipper deals directly with rail carrier. 
• Trailer or container provided by rail carrier. 
• Pick-up and delivery (drayage) of trailer or container provided by rail carrier, either 
directly with rail-owned motor truck or through contract with drayage firm. 
Plans 2 ½, 2 ¼, 2 ¾ 
• All: Shipper deals directly with rail carrier. 
• All: Rail carrier provides trailer or container. 
• 2 ½: Shipper responsible for pick-up and delivery of trailer or container to and from 
rail intermodal terminals.  
• 2 ¼: Rail carrier provides trailer or container pick-up at origin; shipper responsible 
for delivery of trailer or container at destination. 
• 2 ¾: Shipper responsible for movement of trailer or container to intermodal at origin; 
rail carrier provides road delivery of trailer or container at destination. 
Plan 3 
• Shipper* deals directly with rail carrier for line-haul movement of trailer or 
container. 
• Shipper provides trailer or container and drayage thereof at origin and destination.  
*In 1964, the ICC ruled that rail intermodal service under Plan 3 must be made available to 
for-hire motor carriers as well as private shippers (i.e., ‘own-account’ truckers).  
Plan 4 
• Shipper deals directly with a third-party, such as a freight forwarder or shippers’ 
association (cooperative).  
• Third-party entity provides trailer or container, rail car, and pick-up and delivery of 
trailer or container at origin and destination. 
• Rail carrier provides only line-haul rail movement of rail car and trailer or container, 
and charges for movement of rail car and trailer and container, loaded or empty. 
Plan 5 
• Shipper deals with either rail or motor carrier for movement on joint rail-truck rates. 
• Either rail or motor carrier provides trailer or container. 
• Either rail or motor carrier provides pick-up and delivery of container or trailer. 
• Rail carrier provides line-haul rail movement of trailer or container.  
Figure 2.Intermodal Rail Freight Service Plans 
Sources: I.C.C., Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail, docket No. 31375, decided July 30, 1954; Ex Parte No. 230, 
Substituted Service – Piggy-Back, 332 ICC 301, quoted in Locklin, 1966, pp. 870-871.  
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Soon after this modest start however, the PRR established TOFC service (branded as TrucTrain) 
between the New York metropolitan area and Chicago with scheduled trains dedicated 
exclusively to intermodal traffic. Dedicated train operation on fixed schedules between major 
high traffic volume-generating points provided service quality (transit time and reliability) 
competitive with then-extant over-the-road truck movements and made possible high utilization 
of rail rolling stock. This and other features of the PRR’s initiative proved to be seminal for the 
future development of intermodal service, i.e.: 
• Use of long-length (i.e., initially, 75 ft.) flat cars with capacity for two 35 ft.-long trailers, 
which were supplanting the shorter-length trailers (e.g., 24, 26, and 28 feet) of the pioneer 
intermodal era (Morgan, 1960b).  
• Reduction of time and labor expense for transfer of trailers to and from flat cars by 
development and implementation of a robust simplified trailer hitch mechanism of 
standard design mounted on the deck of the rail car to replace the plethora of multi-part 
screw jack/chain and binder systems that had evolved from the 1920s and 30s for 
securing trailers for rail movement.  
• Outsourcing of construction and operation of rail intermodal terminals for loading and 
unloading of trailers.   
• Focus on the hauling of trailers for long-haul truckers for a fixed line-haul rail rate rather 
than largely on joint truck-rail rates based on the type of product carried.  
• “Retailing” of the service by truckers, who controlled customer contact and the price 
(rate) charged to the shippers. Shippers were charged existing standard type-of-
commodity-based motor carrier rates. 
• Strong commitment to introduction and development of intermodal service by key senior 
executives. The PRR’s successful TrucTrain service was championed by its chairman and 
vice president of operations. They counteracted opposition from the company’s vice 
president of traffic (chief commercial officer) who viewed intermodal as a competitive 
threat to the company’s traditional box car (wagon load) business (DeBoer, 1992).   
Another distinctive business model element inspired by PRR officers that became instrumental in 
driving both the universal acceptance and long-run viability of intermodal service was the 
establishment in 1955 of a rail industry-captive firm (Trailer Train Company, subsequently 
renamed TTX Company), to (1) own and provide cars specially equipped for intermodal service, 
renting them to railways on a time-and-mileage basis;  (2) promote development of interline as 
well as single-line intermodal traffic through equipment standardization; (3) maximize 
intermodal equipment utilisation on an industry-wide basis by means of a nation-wide car pool 
from which individual railways could more closely align their car supply with actual needs at 
different points in time; and (4) provide a centralized entity for procurement, financing, 
maintenance, distribution, and other aspects of intermodal rolling stock supply. Some railways 
still meet portions of their intermodal rolling stock needs through direct ownership, and some 
intermodal rolling stock is owned or controlled by intermodal rail service users. However TTX, 
whose share capital is owned by railway companies and their affiliates, is now the dominant 
provider of intermodal rolling stock in North America. (Ford, 1955; Morgan, 1960a; TTX, 2003; 
Derocher, 2004).      
In 1958, the concept of operating dedicated intermodal trains on fixed, frequent, fast schedules 
between hubs (terminals) with business volumes sufficient to marshal trainload quantities of 
trailers and/or containers was emulated by the PRR’s leading rail competitor, the New York 
Central (NYC). However, technological and managerial traits of the NYC’s initiative differed 
markedly from those of the PRR. 
Vertical clearance limits on the NYC’s line between Chicago and New York and Boston 
prohibited TOFC operation. Thus, the NYC and a truck trailer manufacturer devised a container 
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system utilizing rail cars of skeletonized frame design capable of carrying two containers. The 
underframes of the containers, named “Flexi-Vans”, were equipped to accommodate 
demountable rubber-tyred bogies for highway operation.  
The skeletonized frame rail cars offered a reduction in tare weight in comparison with full deck 
flat cars. Also, use of containers rather than trailers for on-rail movement entailed less wind 
resistance and lower tare weight (because of the absence of highway bogies). At intermodal 
terminals, transfer of Flexi-Van containers to and from the skeletonized rail car required only a 
truck tractor.11  These technological and operating characteristics yielded savings in both the 
capital and operating costs of intermodal service. Traffic grew quickly as soon as the new 
equipment was placed in service. By the early 1960s, the NYC was operating a fleet of high speed 
Flexi-Van intermodal trains. Unlike the PRR, NYC owned and operated its intermodal terminals. 
NYC personnel in charge of marketing and operating the fleet, many of them with experience in 
trucking, exercised holistic control over Flexi-Van equipment utilisation and selling price, and measured 
profitability of the service on a route- or lane-specific basis, in the same manner as a well-managed motor 
freight carrier (Morgan, 1960b; Shedd et al., 1960).   
The just-described managerial powers and practices are italicized for emphasis because they 
represent essential conditions for achieving and maintaining business success in intermodal rail 
transport. However, while of seemingly obvious necessity, their application by other railways 
was less than universal during both early and later phases of intermodal service, as will be noted 
further below.  
Although the NYC’s business model for its Flexi-Van service was sound, its use of specially 
designed container equipment proved to be a barrier for substantial interchange of intermodal 
traffic with connecting railroads that used conventional TOFC equipment. Most resisted the 
NYC’s attempts to persuade them to invest in Flexi-Van containers and related rail cars despite 
the cost savings offered by lower tare weight and wind resistance and relatively inexpensive 
transfer of containers between road and rail at terminals. This, together with changes in vertical 
clearance limits on its main lines, led the NYC to begin shifting its intermodal traffic to TOFC 
equipment in 1964.   
The same fate befell simultaneous attempts by three other rail firms to use containers (albeit of 
different design from the Flexi-Van) rather than trailers. By the early 1960s, intermodal rolling 
stock and terminal operating processes for intermodal service on most railways had become 
overwhelmingly ‘trailer centric’. Loading and unloading of trailers from flat cars at terminals was 
by the roll-on-roll-off or ‘circus loading’ method utilizing ramps placed at the ends of one or 
more tracks on which cuts or rakes of flat cars were placed. Hinged bridge plates at opposite 
corners on each flat car were lowered to enable a terminal truck tractor driver to move a trailer 
either backward or forward across the rake of flat cars. Skill and care were required, especially 
for backward moves; an error by a driver while backing across a long rake of flat cars could tip a 
trailer over the edge of the flat car. When loading of an outbound rake of flat cars was completed, 
workers had to manually raise the bridge plates on each car (DeBoer, 1992, p. 65).  
3.3 Progress Amidst Rail Industry Crisis – 1964-1980  
By 1964, rail intermodal traffic volume had grown to more than five times its level in 1955, and 
225 railroads were participating in intermodal service and rate tariffs (Locklin, 1966).  In response 
to this, the ICC in 1964 issued a set of formal rules for the conduct of rail intermodal business. 
                                                        
11 The specially designed rail car contained two hydraulically-operated turntables. A Flexi-Van was loaded by 
backing it up to the rail car at a 90 degree angle until guide rails mounted on the rear of the Flexi-Van’s 
underframe were aligned with one of the turntables. The driver then unlocked pins in the demountable bogie and 
backed the Flexi-Van off the bogie and on to the turntable. When the van was fully engaged on the turntable, it 
was pushed around until it paralleled the rail car and was then locked in place for rail movement.  
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The rules affirmed the legality of the aforementioned intermodal service plans (Figure 2) that the 
railway industry had formulated following the ICC’s favorable responses in 1954 to questions 
posed by the New Haven Railroad. Also fortuitously for rail carriers, the ICC rejected a plea from 
the trucking industry to limit the range of intermodal pricing and service options that rail carriers 
would be permitted to offer (Ex Parte 230, 1964). The positive thrust of this regulatory action 
helped drive continuing growth of intermodal traffic. Between 1965 and 1980, total trailer and 
container traffic rose 83.75%, from 1,664.929 to 3,059.402 (AAR, 2006).   
This growth marked one of the few successes during what became a financial crisis of 
unprecedented severity for the North American railway industry. Conditions became 
particularly acute in the U.S. Northeast and portions of the Midwest, where by 1972 a majority of 
the rail carriers were operating under protection of bankruptcy law (Spychalski, 1997b). Detailed 
coverage of the crisis exceeds the ambit of this paper. Relevant here is the fact that growth of 
intermodal service amidst crisis conditions was enabled by a coalescence of (1) changes in human 
resources, intermodal technology and operations, and commercial practices; (2) projects for 
demonstration of new intermodal service concepts and technology instigated by the Federal 
Railroad Administration; and (3) proactive thrusts by incumbent and prospective rail intermodal 
service users.  
On the human resource front, the efforts of progressive railway officers who had achieved 
success with intermodal initiatives despite internal opposition from less visionary and risk-averse 
colleagues during the 1950s were reinforced in the 1960s when several large railway companies 
initiated programs for recruitment of new management talent from universities and elsewhere 
(DeBoer, 1992). Working in tandem, the progressive incumbents and newcomers identified and 
took actions to improve the quality, efficiency, and profitability of intermodal service. These 
actions can be summarized as follows: 
• Terminal consolidation and establishment of intermodal hubs: By the 1960s, intermodal 
terminals, mainly in the form of ramps for circus loading and unloading of trailers onto 
and off of flat cars, had grown to approximately 2,100 locations. Traffic at many of these 
ramps was low, often subject to seasonal fluctuation, and/or unbalanced (i.e., trailers 
loaded either inbound or outbound only). Such conditions made it impossible to serve 
such terminals at acceptable levels of cost and quality by stopping dedicated intermodal 
trains every 50 to 100 miles to pick up and/or set out as few as one car containing only 
one trailer, or by movement of intermodal shipments in conventional car load service 
trains.  The remedy was closure of low-volume terminals and substitution of highway 
movements of trailers to and from higher volume terminals or hubs (Greenwood, 1999, p. 
162).  
• Terminal mechanisation: Circus loading and unloading of trailers onto and off of 
intermodal rail cars was replaced by side-lift and top-lift equipment capable of handling 
both containers and trailers. Lift-on-lift-off loading was speedier, safer and hence more 
productive than circus loading. The shift to it, made feasible by widespread acquisition of 
trailers with side/top-lift-compatible structural design standards, thus complemented the 
economic benefits of concentrating intermodal traffic at fewer relatively high-volume 
terminals (Roberts, 1967, 1969; Valentine, 1999). 
• Demonstration projects: Historically, research and development for intermodal 
technology and operations and most other aspects of rail transport in the United States 
has been left to private sector entities (Gallamore, 1999). An  exception was an initiative 
during the 1970s by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)12 to establish projects for 
testing the technical and economic feasibility of operating intermodal rail freight service 
                                                        
12 An agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation. 
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in shorter-distance (i.e., 200-450 miles)  high-volume corridors with relatively frequent, 
short-length, low cost trains that would capture traffic from all-highway movement. FRA 
staff who progressed the initiative were largely the aforementioned ‘new generation’ 
railway managerial and analytical personnel who had been seconded to FRA service from 
their posts in the railway industry. Their initial challenge was finding officers within 
railway companies who favored collaboration with the FRA’s initiative and who could 
overcome opposition to it by fellow officers.  
Two projects were implemented. The first, branded as Slingshot, ran on a 280-mile-route 
between Chicago and East St. Louis, Illinois. Slingshot was inspired by efforts of FRA 
personnel but received no FRA funding. The second, Sprint, founded with FRA financial 
assistance, ran 421 miles between Chicago and St. Paul-Minneapolis, Minnesota. Both 
featured truck-competitive frequencies of between three and five trains per day. Special 
labour agreements were negotiated to permit operation of the relatively short-length 
trains with crews of reduced size (i.e., two or three persons rather than the then-common 
five) working over greater distances for a base day of pay. Another key feature was 
procurement of so-called ‘anchor customers’ (United Parcel Service (UPS) for Slingshot, 
and UPS and the U.S. Postal Service for Sprint) to provide guaranteed base loads of traffic 
and revenue.  
Both Slingshot and Sprint continued for several years following completion of their test 
phases. For its operator, Sprint was a success, enabling capture of profitable traffic from 
all-highway movements. The FRA saw success in both projects. They provided empirical 
evidence of the results of new operating and marketing concepts, validated activity-based 
costing techniques, elicited cooperative responses from rail labor on adjustments in labor 
contracts essential to economic viability of the service, stimulated creativity within both 
the railway and railway equipment supplier industries, and inspired several other 
railways to begin operation of intermodal trains under special labor agreements (DeBoer, 
1992).  
• Proactive support and leadership from customers: The role of United Parcel Service as an 
anchor or base customer for Slingshot requires elaboration here. Although primarily a 
road transport operator, UPS began using intermodal rail service in 1969 to move trailer 
loads of parcel express shipments between hubs on lanes (links) in its network in which 
traffic volume and other conditions made intermodal use of greater economic value than 
over-the-road trucking. From that beginning, UPS has grown to become the railway 
industry’s dominant customer for domestic (i.e., intra-North American) intermodal 
traffic. In some lanes, its volume has reached full trainload levels. In many others, the 
traffic and revenues that it brings to railways as the leading base customer have enabled 
operation of greater numbers of scheduled intermodal trains, the carrying capacity of 
which is ‘filled out’ with trailer and/or container shipments tendered by other intermodal 
users. Over the years, UPS has taken extraordinary actions to obtain the intermodal 
service quality that it needs – e.g., putting UPS supervisors in intermodal terminals to 
work with railway staff in the loading and unloading of UPS trailers and containers 
(Maisch, 1999). 
• Rolling stock innovation – single-level low tare weight cars: By the early 1970s, the shift 
from circus loading to top-lift transfer of trailers in terminals had eliminated the need for 
full-deck intermodal rail cars. Simultaneously, growth in rail movement of ocean 
containers reawakened interest in the use of containers for domestic intermodal 
shipments. These developments together with a quest for improving the profitability of 
intermodal business inspired several railway equipment manufacturers and two rail 
carriers with large intermodal traffic volumes to design, build, and operate lightweight, 
lower center of gravity intermodal cars that were less expensive to build and operate, and 
(with some exceptions) could accommodate either trailers or containers. However, 
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industry-wide realization of the economic benefit of these rolling stock innovations was 
slow. TTX, by then the single largest owner of intermodal rolling stock, did not acquire 
post-prototype light weight stock until the 1980s. It wanted to protect its large investment 
in full-deck flat cars and thus limited technological change to increases in car length and 
other relatively modest refinements (DeBoer, 1992).  
• Rolling stock innovation – double-stack: The post-1956 ‘container revolution’ in ocean 
transport resulted in growing use of rail intermodal service by ocean carriers. This 
evolved into three categories: (1) Landbridge service, for movement of containers 
between the Far East and Europe using trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic water transport 
combined with rail intermodal service across North America in lieu of all-water service; 
(2) Minibridge service, involving substitution of joint water-rail movements for all-water 
movements to and from U.S. port locations (e.g., transfer of a container from water to rail 
at a Pacific Coast port for movement to a city on the Gulf Coast or Atlantic Coast in lieu 
of an all-water movement via the Panama Canal); and (3) Microbridge service, for 
movement of ocean containers between a port and an interior city.   
An early major rail participant in such ‘ex-ocean’ container traffic was the Southern 
Pacific. During the 1960s, the SP’s research and development department, with support 
from a senior executive, began a search for ways to reduce the costs and increase the 
profitability of carrying ocean containers. A seminal result of this effort by 1970 was a 
design for an articulated double-stack container car. However, the senior executive who 
had championed the effort left the SP before a prototype of the design could be built.  
The design thus lay dormant until a rail carrier encountered severe capacity constraints in 
the movement of ex-ocean container traffic for Sea-Land Service. This sent a Sea-Land 
executive with rail experience on an urgent search for a solution. His efforts culminated 
in collaboration between Sea-Land, SP, and a freight car manufacturer to refine and bring 
to fruition the concepts for double-stack equipment that had been devised earlier by SP’s 
research staff. Double-stacking of containers approximately doubled the container 
carrying capacity of both dedicated intermodal trains and the track required for train 
movements. Test operations of new double-stack equipment validated its economic value 
and set the stage for the post-1980 double-stack revolution, to be given attention below 
(Ingram, 1999 and 2006). 
3.4 Post-Economic Deregulation – 1980-Present 
The financial crisis that threatened collapse of rail service in the U.S. Northeast and parts of the 
Midwest during the 1970s sparked enactment of legislation in 1976 and 198013 which greatly 
reduced the comprehensive range of federal economic regulation that had been imposed on the 
U.S. railway industry onward from 1887. Of major significance for the future of intermodal traffic 
were provisions in the legislation that empowered the ICC to exempt from economic regulation 
specific categories of traffic for which competition between rail and other modes had become 
sufficient to prevent or minimize monopoly abuse of freight service users. Intermodal service, 
given its high degree of competitiveness with over-the-road trucking, thus stood as a prime 
candidate for early application of the new exemption power. Regulation of pricing and service 
offerings for domestic intermodal rail traffic was eliminated by the ICC in 1998, and international 
intermodal rail traffic in 1981. (Spychalski, 2002; De Boer, 1992).  
Unlike in the U.S., economic regulation of intermodal rail transport in Canada has been minimal. 
Canadian railway companies’ intermodal services have, from their inception, been shaped largely 
by market forces (National, etc., 1993; Purdy, 1972). 
                                                        
13 The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.  
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Having gained complete commercial freedom for conducting intermodal business, rail service 
providers developed and implemented aggressive and innovative business strategies during the 
1980s to more effectively compete for intermodal freight. They achieved stunning success. 
Between 1980 and 1990, the total number of trailers and containers carried by U.S. main line 
railways doubled from 3,1 million  to 6,2 million (AAR, 2006). Improved business practices were 
prominent drivers of this success. They included efforts to (1) more accurately measure 
intermodal operating costs and profitability, and (2) identify and implement methods for more 
effectively meeting customer service requirements while simultaneously reducing TOFC/ COFC 
unit costs (Greenwood, 1999).  
The need for advancements in intermodal rail service quality coupled with achievement of 
greater efficiency in providing it was intensified by two U.S. federal government policy actions 
concerning trucking. The first, in 1980, was passage of legislation14 that almost completely 
eliminated economic regulation of interstate motor freight transport. The second, in 1982, was 
enactment of legislation15 which increased truck size and weight limits. Shorn of economic 
regulation and the relative rigidity that it had imposed on their pricing and on the points that 
they could serve, motor freight carriers immediately began to compete aggressively on the basis 
of price against both one another and against railways. Rate-cutting was particularly deep for full 
truckload-sized shipments, the category of traffic most susceptible for diversion from both 
intermodal rail freight service and rail car load service. Numerous trucking firms ultimately 
failed in this competitive environment, as their total revenues fell below total costs for prolonged 
periods of time. However, surviving firms benefited from the increases in over-the-road 
operating efficiency and revenue productivity that were made possible by the increases in truck 
size and weight limits (Belzer, 2000). 
Despite this government policy-enabled increase in competitive pressure from over-the-road 
trucking, U.S. intermodal rail traffic grew 36.7% during the first half of the 1980s (AAR, 2006). 
Actions contributing to this result included reductions in trailer and container transit time and 
increases in service reliability in the form of on-time delivery of trailers and containers. These 
service quality improvements were achieved by giving intermodal trains priority over those 
carrying other types of traffic, by (on some railways) raising maximum speed for dedicated 
intermodal trains to 70 mph. where permitted by track conditions, topography, and weather, and 
by rigorous adherence to schedules for operation of intermodal trains. In addition, the complete 
flexibility over pricing provided by deregulation enabled rapid responsiveness to new business 
opportunities, and vigorous use of demand-oriented differential pricing to optimize revenue 
generation and capacity utilization in the operation of scheduled, dedicated, semi-fixed consist 
intermodal trains. With differential pricing, trailers and containers priced to yield the highest 
profit margins were given first priority in the filling of available train capacity, followed seriatim 
by acceptance of traffic with successively higher levels of price sensitivity (Ingram, 2006; 
Schmitter, 2007).   
Other dominant drivers of intermodal rail traffic growth, efficiency and service quality during 
the 1980s included (1) the start of explosive growth in imports of products from Pacific Rim 
countries, and (2) rapid transition of the double-stack container car from its test phase at the end 
of the 1970s to a type of equipment with proven operational and economic advantages over other 
types of intermodal rolling stock. The large increases in international shipments strengthened 
ocean carriers’ ability to tender full-trainload quantities of containers and, simultaneously, 
strengthened their negotiating power for rates and service with rail carriers. This set in motion a 
chain of events in which several ocean carriers, building on the pioneering effort by Sea-Land 
noted previously, took lead roles in inducing acquisition and operation of double-stack cars in 
fleet-sized quantities.  
                                                        
14 Motor Carrier Act of 1980. 
15 Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982.   
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At the forefront was American President Lines (APL), a then-leading container ship operator in 
Pacific trade lanes. APL viewed the cost savings of double-stack over conventional single-level 
COFC/TOFC cars (estimated at between 20 and 25%, including line-haul, terminal, drayage, and 
other cost factors) as providing it with an economically effective means for keeping its use of 
Landbridge and Minibridge services competitive with all-water service that two of its rival ocean 
carrier were proposing to operate with new low-cost jumbo containerships. APL’s business plan 
embodied operation of dedicated high-capacity trains with APL-owned double-stack cars, and 
rigorous round-trip management of the equipment, including marketing efforts to obtain 
domestic shipments for utilization of west-bound backhaul movements of containers and double-
stack cars. By 1986, APL together with several other ocean carriers had succeeded  in putting into 
place a proprietary double-stack intermodal service network of about 35 ‘stack trains’ (Down and 
Wise, 1986).  
Double-stacking yielded greater efficiency in the form of both line-haul cost savings (e.g., 30-40% 
lower per container, vis-à-vis single-level loading) from greater economies of scale in train 
operation, and greater economies of density in track capacity utilisation. It also enhanced an 
important element of service quality: use of articulated multiple-unit double-stack cars revealed 
that their design characteristics virtually eliminated damage to lading from the slack action 
inherent in train operation and from the vertical shock sometimes experienced with 89-ft flat cars. 
Articulated single-level multi-platform spine cars capable of carrying either containers or trailers 
offered similar ride quality advantages. These features made containers increasingly attractive 
vis-à-vis trailers for intra-North American intermodal shipments, despite the need for acquiring, 
maintaining, and coordinating the chassis required for trucking of containers to and from 
intermodal terminals. Between 1990 and 2005, intermodal shipments moved annually in 
containers rose from about 6.2 million to 2.9 million (AAR, 2006). 
As noted earlier, for-hire truckers have been users of intermodal rail service ever since its pioneer 
era. However, aside from the previously-mentioned extraordinary initiative of United Parcel 
Service, intermodal service did not begin to win acceptance as a preferred line-haul movement 
alternative for relatively large portions of the traffic bases of trucking companies until about 1990, 
when J. B. Hunt Transport Services and Schneider National Corporation, two of the largest long-
haul truckload (TL) motor carriers, began shifting their trailer traffic in high-volume lanes to rail. 
Both companies subsequently converted much of their fleet equipment from trailers to domestic 
containers, which have grown to lengths (e.g., 48- and 53-ft), widths (8.5 ft.) and heights (9.5 ft.) 
that match the dimensions of contemporary standard long-haul trailers (Muller, 1999). Since 2000, 
the combined effects of sharp rises in diesel fuel prices, high turnover in drivers, and increased 
road congestion have driven numerous other trucking companies to follow the lead of Hunt and 
Schneider in committing long-distance line-haul movements to rail (Gallagher, 2008; Boyd, 2008).  
Other important recent events and evolving conditions critical to intermodal rail traffic growth 
include: 
• Continuous improvements in information technology and in the timeliness and accuracy 
of information needed for effective management of intermodal service by providers and 
users. 
• Reduced time and increased reliability for interchange of intermodal traffic between 
connecting rail operators. 
• Major capital investments in infrastructure to increase capacity and improve the flow of 
intermodal traffic, e.g., additional main line track; large-scale intermodal terminals; and 
enlargement of overhead clearances in tunnels and at bridges to allow operation of 
double-stack equipment.  (Consolidated Rail Corporation, 1995; Norfolk Southern, 2006; 
Lustig, 2002; Burlington Northern Santa Fe, 2007; Kansas City Southern, 2005). 
Intermodal traffic and revenues have become major components (20-30%) of the revenue bases of 
North American railways (see, e.g., Canadian Pacific, 2007, and Burlington Northern Santa Fe, 
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2007). Since the 1990s, intermodal service has also come to be seen as generating adequate levels 
of profitability in relation to the assets required for its supply. A key driver of this achievement 
has been growth in rail pricing power, as freight transport users’ perceived value of intermodal 
service vis-à-vis all-truck service has risen (Frailey, 2004).  
4. Conclusion: selected comments – North America and Europe 
Having exposited key drivers of intermodal rail freight growth in North America, we conclude 
with selected comments on their relevance and applicability to intermodal rail freight in Europe.  
The word relevance as used here refers to a driver of growth that has proven effective in North 
America and thus deserves to be considered for application in Europe. Applicability refers to the 
extent to whether a driver can function under technical, business process, cultural, and political 
conditions distinctive to Europe.  
A business model for North American rail operators of intermodal service that has proven most 
essential for business success includes (a) running trains dedicated exclusively or primarily to 
intermodal traffic on fixed schedules between major high traffic-generating terminals; (b) 
consistent on-time train operation; (c) pricing methods designed to yield acceptable gross and net 
levels of intermodal revenue; (d) route- or corridor-specific measurement of intermodal financial 
performance; (e) holistic managerial control encompassing all operational and commercial 
actions; and (f) technology for timely provision of information, both internally and to customers.  
This model is, in principle, of equal relevance in both North America and Europe. Fulfillment of 
freight shippers’ logistics and supply chain management needs requires that the quality and price 
of intermodal rail service be strongly competitive with that of all-road trucking service. However, 
full applicability of the model to intra-European international intermodal service is presently 
inhibited by barriers to timely and cost-effective cross-border freight train operation. The 
barriers, ranging from technical and economic to behavioural and socio-political, impose a 
competitive handicap on rail freight transport, since trucks cross borders within the EU without 
comparable delays. Solutions to technical barriers, albeit sometimes costly, are readily available – 
e.g., multi-current electric locomotives equipped and certified for operation on two or more 
national rail infrastructures. Changes in mindsets essential for rendering intermodal service are, 
however, more challenging and time-consuming to achieve. Prescriptions for diminishing these 
barriers exceed the ambit of this paper. Suffice it to say here that the need for their timely 
diminution appears urgent if Europe is to obtain more fully the benefits that greater use of 
intermodal rail freight transport can provide (Ghijsen et al., 2007; REORIENT, 2007).   
An intermodal service quality impediment of much greater significance in Europe than in North 
America is scarcity of track time slots for freight train movements. Except in the U.S. Northeast 
Corridor and a few other locations, U.S. and Canadian rail systems are predominantly freight-
oriented, and service quality-sensitive intermodal trains typically receive priority over other 
types of freight trains.  In Europe, passenger traffic density constrains rail operators’ ability to 
fulfill shippers’ time requirements for freight movements.  
The present-day business model for most North American intermodal traffic focuses on long 
hauls (e.g., 600-2,500 miles) and features operation of high-horsepower locomotives drawing long 
trains often exceeding 100 cars and carrying (with double-stacked containers) upwards of 200 or 
more containers. Such operation yields significant economies of scale at the train operating unit 
level, and economies of density in use of track capacity. Productivity increases provided by these 
business model characteristics have contributed greatly to improvements in the profitability of 
intermodal service. Also, they have enabled U.S. and Canadian railways to more effectively 
accommodate the upsurge in international container traffic that has ensued from globalisation 
and the shift of much manufacturing to Asia and elsewhere.  
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European intermodal rail freight operators have also gained from technological advances in 
equipment and growth in international container traffic. However, their attainment of economies 
of scale in train operation approaching those prevalent in North America is made impossible by 
well-known infrastructure barriers such as loading gauge constraints (e.g., vertical clearance 
limits imposed by overpasses, tunnels, and catenary on electrified  lines that bar double-stacking 
of containers), freight car axle weight limits, and signal (traffic control) systems designed for 
movement of trains at higher speeds and shorter lengths than are common in North America 
(Reorient, 2007). Nevertheless, the existence of these particular barriers is not as undesirable as it 
might seem. Lengths-of-haul in existing and prospective European intermodal rail freight 
transport markets are, in most instances, at what are considered short-to-medium distances in 
North America. Experience with operation of intermodal service within such distances in the U.S. 
(e.g., the Sprint and Slingshot demonstrations discussed above in section 3.3) indicates that its 
achievement of commercial success requires operation of relatively short, frequent, and fast 
trains. Train length and frequency are the most critical success factors in short-haul markets 
because of the time required for (a) draying (trucking) intermodal containers and trailers between 
shippers’ and consignees’ premises and rail intermodal terminals; (b) transferring containers 
between road and rail car; (c) marshaling enough trailers and/or containers to load a train of 
acceptable revenue-generating size, and (d) – after steps a, b, and c are accomplished – offering a 
shipper-to-consignee service at least equivalent in value to competing over-the-road trucking 
service. 
The just-discussed sub-topic marks an appropriate point at which to conclude. The comparative 
strengths and weaknesses of alternative business model characteristics for achieving success with 
intermodal rail freight service will undoubtedly always be open to debate. Of arguably greatest 
current importance in both Europe and North America is the minimum rail-haul distance within 
which economically viable intermodal service can be provided. In Europe, it is of importance 
because of the existence of relatively few markets with lengths considered long-haul in North 
America. In North America, most intermodal operators have achieved economic success by 
focusing largely on long-haul traffic. However, the greatest growth in North American intercity 
freight traffic has been in short-to-intermediate distance markets. Rail operators’ disinterest in 
seeking ways to capture at least a portion of the growth in these markets has left truckers capture 
it. The rationale for this disinterest appears to be deserving of scrutiny, given the environmental, 
energy-saving, and road congestion-reducing advantages of rail vs. truck freight movement.   
References 
AAR (2006). Railroad Facts. Association of American Railroads, Washington, DC. 
A fence in the north, too. (2008). The Economist, vol. 386, no. 8569, pp. 40-41.  
Ainsworth, D.P. (1975). Intermodal Systems Concepts: Research Needs. Railroad Research Study 
Background Papers. Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC., pp. 237-243. 
Belzer, M.H. (2000). Sweatshops on Wheels – Winners and Losers in Trucking Deregulation. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford and New York.   
Boyd, J.D. (2008). Schneider Taps Rail Partners. Traffic World, vol. 272, no. 7, p. 36. 
Boyer, K.D. (1997). American Trucking, NAFTA and the Cost of Distance. The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. XXXI, no. 1, pp. 55-65. 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation (2007). 2007 Annual Report and Form 10-K.  
Canadian Pacific Railway(2007). 2007 Annual Report.   
Consolidated Rail Corporation (1995). 1995 Annual Report.  
EJTIR 9(1), March 2009, pp 63-82 
Spychalski and Thomchick 




DeBoer, D.J. (1992). Piggyback and Containers. Golden West Books, San Marino, CA. 
Derocher, R.J. (2004). By the Numbers – TTX. Progressive Railroading, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. T-1 – T-26. 
DeWitt, W., and Clinger, J. (2000). Intermodal Freight Transportation. Transportation Research Board 
Committee on Intermodal Freight Transport. Retrieved February 2009 from 
www.trb.org/publications/millennium/00061.pdf  
Down, J.W., and Wise, D.H. (1986). The Intermodal Challenge. Traffic World, vol. 205, no. 11, pp. 30-36.  
Evers, P.T., and Johnson, C.J. (2000). Performance Perceptions, Satisfaction, and Intention: The 
Intermodal Shipper’s Perspective. Transportation Journal, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 27-39.   
Ex Parte No. 230, (1964). Substituted Service – Piggy-Back, 332 ICC 301. 
Ford, N. (1955). Piggyback Spreads Out. Modern Railroads, vol. 10, no. 12, pp. 61-72. 
Frailey, F.W. (1994). BNSF Reborn. Trains Magazine, vol. 64, no. 10, pp. 29-44. 
Gallagher, J. (2008). Hunt on Intermodal Track. Traffic World, vol. 272, no. 16, p. 19. 
Gallamore, R.E. (1999). In: Gomez-Ibanez, J., Tye, W.B., and Winston, C. (eds.) Essays in Transportation 
Economics and Policy – A Handbook in Honor of John R. Meyer. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 
D.C., pp. 493-529.   
Ghijsen, P.W.Th., Semeijn, J., and van der Linden, H. (2007). Rail Freight in Europe: Different 
Perspectives on Achieving Higher Service Levels. Transportation Journal, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 42-57.   
Grant, H.R. (1984). The Corn Belt Route – A History of the Chicago Great Western Railroad Company. 
Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb, IL.   
Greenwood, W.E. (1999). Intermodal at BN. Intermodal Founding Fathers of North 
America Conference. University of Denver, Intermodal Transportation Institute, Denver, CO, pp. 81-84.  
Hamel G.  (2000). Leading the Revolution. Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
Hofsommer, D.L. (1986). The Southern Pacific 1901 – 1985. Texas A & M University Press, College 
Station, TX. 
I.C.C. (1954). Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail, Docket No. 31375, decided July 30, 1954.  
Ingram, R.S. (1999). Developing the Mini-bridge Business at Sea-Land, and Developing the 
Doublestack (edited audiotape). Intermodal Founding Fathers of North America  Conference, University of 
Denver, Intermodal Transportation Institute, Denver, CO, pp.  81-84.  
Ingram, R.S. (2006). (Former Vice President-Intermodal, Burlington Northern Railroad.) Lecture on 
reformation of Burlington Northern’s intermodal business. Smeal College of Business, The 
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, November 17, 2006. 
Kansas City Southern (2005). Annual Report. 
Lustig, D. (2002). Alameda Corridor opens faster route to ports. Trains Magazine, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 10-
11. 
Locklin, D.P. (1966). Economics of Transportation. Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, IL.   
Maisch, Sr, R.H. (1999). Comments on UPS and the railroad-intermodal operation. Intermodal Founding 
Fathers of North America Conference. University of Denver, Intermodal Transportation Institute, Denver, 
CO, vol., no., pp. 113-116.  
McKenzie, D.R., North, M.C. and Smith, D.S. (1989). Intermodal Transportation – the Whole Story. 
Simmons-Boardman Books, Inc., Omaha, NE. 
Mitchell, D.W. and Coles, C.B. (2004). Establishing a Continuing Business Model Innovation Process. 
The Journal of Business Strategy, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 39-50.  
Morgan, D.P. (1960a). What Price Piggyback? Trains Magazine, vol. 20, no. 7, pp. 30-42. 
EJTIR 9(1), March 2009, pp 63-82 
Spychalski and Thomchick 




Morgan, D.P. (1960b). The Paraphernalia of Piggyback. Trains Magazine, vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 37-45.  
Moulton, H.G. and Associates (1933). The American Transportation Problem. The Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC.   
Muller, G. (1999). Intermodal Freight Transportation. 3rd ed., Eno Transportation Foundation and 
Intermodal Association of North America, Washington, DC.  
National Transportation Act Review Commission (1993). Competition in Transportation – Policy and 
Legislation in Review. vol. 2., Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, ON. 
Norfolk Southern Corporation (2006). Annual Report.   
Purdy, H.L. (1972). Transport Competition and Public Policy in Canada. University of British Columbia 
Press, Vancouver, BC.   
REORIENT (2007). Implementing Change in the European Railway. Final Report to the European 
Commission, Project no. 513567. available at:  http://www.reorient.no/ (assessed  February 2009). 
Roberts, R. (1967). Trailer Lifter Catches On. Modern Railroads, vol. 22, no. 8, pp. 93-94.  
Roberts, R. (1969). Suppliers Meet Hardware Challenge. Modern Railroads, vol. 24, no. 11, pp. 62-64. 
Sarathy, R. (2006). Security and the Global Supply Chain. Transportation Journal, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 28-
51. 
Schmid, B. Alt. R., Zimmermann, H.  and Buchet, B.  (2001). Anniversary edition:  business models.  
Electronic Markets, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 3-9. 
Schmitter, J. (2007). (Former Manager – Eastbound Intermodal Traffic, Consolidated Rail Corporation.) 
Personal interview, February 6, University Park, Pennsylvania. 
Shashikumar, N., and Schatz, G.L. (2000). The Impact of U. S. Regulatory Changes on International 
Intermodal Movements. Transportation Journal, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 5-14.  
Shed, T., Ford, N. and Donnelly, C. (1960). Flexi-Van: Central’s Brightest Star. Modern Railroads, vol. 
15, no. 11, pp. 22-23.  
Soin, K. and Scheytt, T. (2006). Making the Case for Narrative Methods in Cross-Cultural 
Organizational Research.  Organizational Research Methods, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 55-78.  
Spicer, M.W. (2008). The History of Ideas and Normative Research in Public Administration:  Some 
Personal Reflections.  Administrative Theory & Praxis, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 50-71. 
Spychalski, J.C. (1997a). From ICC to STB: Continuing Vestiges of US Surface Transport Regulation. 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, vol. XXXI, no. 1, pp. 131-136.  
Spychalski, J.C. (1997b). Rail Transport: Retreat and Resurgence. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. XXXI, no. 1, pp. 131-136. 
Spychalski, J.C. (2002). Social Control of Rail Transport in the United States. In: Miller, E.S. and 
Samuels, W.J. (eds.) The Institutionalist Approach to Public Utilities Regulation. Michigan State University 
Press, East Lansing, Michigan, pp. 297-340.   
Taylor, J.C. and Jackson, G.C. (2000). Conflict, Power, and Evolution in the Intermodal Transportation 
Industry’s Channel of Distribution. Transportation Journal, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 5-17. 
Taylor, J.C., Robideaux, D.R. and Jackson, G.C. (2004). U.S.-Canada Transportation and Logistics: 
Border Impacts and Costs, Causes, and Possible Solutions. Transportation Journal, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 5-
21. 
TTX Company (2003). Annual Report. 
UGPTI and ENO (2007). Transportation in America, 20th ed., Upper Great Plains Transportation 
Institute, North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND, and Eno Transportation Foundation, 
Washington, DC.  
EJTIR 9(1), March 2009, pp 63-82 
Spychalski and Thomchick 




Valentine, D.P. (1999). Intermodal Business on the Santa Fe Railway (edited audiotape). Intermodal 
Founding Fathers of North America Conference, University of Denver, Intermodal Transportation 
Institute, vol., no., pp. 79-81.  
Viscio, A. and Paternack, B. (1996). Toward a new business model.  Strategy and Business, vol. 20, 2nd 
quarter.  
Voelpel, S.C., Leibold, M. and Tekie, E.B. (2004). The Wheel of Business Model Reinvention: How to 
Reshape Your Business Model to Leapfrog Competitors. Journal of Change Management, vol. 4, no. 3, 
pp. 259-276.   
White, J.H. (1984). An Early Chapter in Freight Handling, Cincinnati and the Container. Queen City 
Heritage, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 25-34. 
Wilson, G.W. (1980). Economic Analysis of Intercity Freight Transportation. Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, IN. 
 
